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Preface
The focus of this paper concerns the effects of the different command hangar queen (HQ) programs currently in place for the Combat Air Forces. These differences are based on the thresholds established to determine when an aircraft becomes a HQ. The importance of this issue can be seen in the additional workload placed on aircraft maintenance personnel to return aircraft to flight based on an unvalidated requirement.
By consolidating the studies performed on cannibalizations (CANNs) and the HQ program, this paper attempts to provide an understanding of the rationale and effects/benefits of the different HQ thresholds. Hopefully, this research combined with new guidance from the Air Staff on CANNs to prevent HQs will prevent unnecessary CANNs.
I had several people who were crucial to completing this research project. 
Abstract
Command hangar queen (HQ) programs were established to prevent aircraft from becoming permanent parts donor aircraft. These programs helped eliminate the practice of creating aircraft hulks that would never fly again. HQs are measured by the number of days an aircraft remains on the ground without flying. These thresholds were based on anecdotal beliefs/evidence and were not standardized between the commands, even for like aircraft. The HQ program was/is a driving factor in returning aircraft to flight. This paper focuses on the effects of the different command HQ thresholds on aircraft maintenance for fighter aircraft. It presents the background of the HQ programs and outlines the current guidance along with its effects. The key research area involves the review of previous CANN/HQ program studies and a survey of current logistic group commanders/deputy operations group commanders for maintenance. This research shows that longer HQ thresholds provide benefits and flexibility for aircraft management.
The most controversial issue concerning this is the effect of leaving aircraft down for a longer period. While no study has been done to determine the "right" time to keep an aircraft down without a negative effect, the data showed that extending the downtime beyond 30 days provided benefits without negatively impacting return to flight.
The main point of the final recommendation was that the HQ programs should be standardized throughout the combat air forces. There is no rationale behind the current disconnects between the commands. 
Hangar Queen Program Background
The Hangar Queen (HQ) Program was established to prevent aircraft from becoming a permanent parts donor aircraft. In the past, aircraft had been left down as the designated cannibalization (CANN) aircraft so long that a major effort was required to return them to flight due to the number of parts removed and documentation problems.
Any discussions concerning the need for a HQ program are usually met with examples of aircraft hulks being hidden in a hangar never to fly again and statements concerning the negative effects of keeping an aircraft on the ground too long. In an effort to prevent this from happening, several major commands established HQ programs requiring command level oversight for aircraft that were down over an established time. The problem with these programs was that no in-depth study was performed to determine the appropriate HQ threshold. As early as the mid-1980's, the prescribed down times associated with the different command HQ programs were not standardized even though they operated the same types of aircraft. The focus of this research paper is to look at the history of the different command HQ thresholds, review previous HQ/CANN studies, and assess the current field maintenance leaderships' opinions of the HQ thresholds. This study will include the impact of the standards on aircraft CANNs and aircraft availability. While this research will not result in a specific recommendation of the appropriate HQ threshold for the combat air forces, it hopes to analyze the effects of the different programs using like aircraft to show which of the current command standards is most beneficial. The root of this issue is the unavailability of parts, which leads to the need to cannibalize parts and consolidate the missing components to the least number of aircraft to increase aircraft availability.
Understanding Cannibalization
Our fundamental policy is to cannibalize only when it is absolutely mission-critical.
-Lt Gen Micheal E. Zettler Deputy Chief of Staff/Installations and Logistics
Cannibalization is the removal of a serviceable component from one aircraft to repair another aircraft. This situation occurs as the result of unavailability of components in the supply system.
Because CANNs double the maintenance workload, specific guidance/procedures are in place at the command and unit level to help control/minimize them. Since there is no realistic way to prevent the need for CANNs, it is important to ensure that CANNs resulting from command guidance such as the HQ program are minimized and performed based on a validated requirement.
Cost of Cannibalization
Canibalization is a quality of life issue.
-Lt Gen Micheal E. Zettler Deputy Chief of Staff/Installations and Logistics
Cannibalization is a major Air Force issue as evidenced by the numerous studies, audits, and congressional testimonies on the subject. While CANNs are a necessity and have became a way of life in today's Air Force; they bring with them numerous effects ranging from increased workload to a negative impact on the morale of aircraft maintenance technicians. In the Air Force, CANN rates are measured as a metric of canns per100 sorties. "In FY00, the total USAF maintenance man-hours expended on CANN were over 561,000 maintenance hours-approximately 2 percent of all maintenance man-hours dedicated to all aircraft maintenance that year."
1 As outlined in figure 1 , CANNs require at least twice the maintenance time of normal repairs. While there is no study to examine the impact of CANNs on the components themselves, it is obvious that this does cause additional wear and tear on the parts to include the ones removed to gain access to the needed component. 
Aircraft Availability
The other key element for consideration in this research paper is aircraft availability.
It is a daily struggle for aircraft maintainers to match the number of aircraft available with flying, maintenance training, and scheduled maintenance requirements. In an effort to maximize aircraft availability, units designate aircraft as "cann jets" to consolidate unavailable parts to one aircraft. It is these aircraft that are the main focus of this paper.
The impact on availability is seen during CANN jet swapout when two aircraft are unavailable for scheduling purposes. Though the HQ program is not the only reason for CANN jet swapout, it is a driving factor.
Aircraft Availability Impact
Because nearly every fighter squadron will have its own CANN jet, the HQ Forces. Exceptions to standardization were made on maintenance issues where the commands could not come to an agreement. The intent was to minimize these exceptions by ensuring they were driven by a unique operating environment in a command, not based on tradition or individual preferences. Even though it was not because of a unique command environment, HQ thresholds were one area were the commands could not come to a consensus. Threshold Methodology. The AFLMA study was followed by a six-month test at two PACAF locations to validate the change in policy, both of these studies will be discussed further in the Review of Previous Studies Section of this paper. The rationale for the change as outlined in an August 1994 position paper cited reduced CANN rate/manhours, less wear/tear and avoidance of occasional breakage of components, and no negative impact on return to flight or supply support. 
Air Combat Command

United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE)
USAFE's current HQ guidance matches PACAF's. Originally, USAFE maintained the same threshold as ACC, but in September 2000 USAFE adopted the 50-day standard.
This change was based on a desire to increase aircraft availability by decreasing the number of times two aircraft would be down for CANN jet swapout. USAFE also wanted to provide the field units more flexibility in making the right management decisions on when to return "cann jets" to flight. Because there had been no in-depth studies performed to determine the right threshold, USAFE chose to extend their standard based on PACAF's experience with the 50-day standard. 
Air Staff Guidance
The most recent development on this issue is the addition of a HQ section in AFI 21-101, dated 13 February 2002. This addition has two key sentences as part of its general guidance stating, "Cannibalization will not be used to return the aircraft to a flying status for the sole purpose of preventing HQ reporting. Reporting procedures are intended to provide higher level assistance to field units and will not be construed as a "report card"." 4 This guidance does not say CANNs should not be used to return the aircraft to flight; rather, that those CANNs should not be driven by the HQ program.
Management Effects of the Different Thresholds
The statistical effects of the different HQ thresholds will be covered in the Review of Previous Studies Section done later in this paper; however, the impact on management actions can be initially discussed here. While all of the commands' goals are to ensure increased supervisory involvement in aircraft that are down for extended periods, the key difference between the 30 and 50-day thresholds is the reporting/tracking of HQs to/by the higher headquarters. The fact that Category 1 HQs are being reported as part of the wing's monthly metrics to HQ ACC after 30 days will push some units to take the actions necessary, CANNs, to avoid what is perceived as a negative statistic.
The new Air Staff guidance needs to be emphasized to ensure units understand its intent.
MAJCOM guidance needs re-enforce the new AFI 21-101 guidance on not performing
CANNs to solely prevent HQs. All aircraft maintainers will agree that there is a limit to the number of days an aircraft can remain on the ground without causing problems in returning it to flight. The problem is that the HQ thresholds have been arbitrarily determined based on anecdotal evidence/beliefs. While neither of the current thresholds is the right number, we can examine the effects of the two programs to determine which one has the most benefits and then standardize it across the Combat Air Forces. The HQ program needs to continue to increase management oversight on aircraft down for "extended" periods; however, it should not drive maintenance actions based solely on a calendar. Maintenance actions should be driven by a validated requirement to return the aircraft to service. 
Review of Previous Studies
In researching this issue, it was interesting to trace the studies that have been performed on the issue of HQ programs and CANNs. The data and recommendations of these studies will be outlines below.
The reactions/comments of various commands/agencies to the findings/recommendations of the various studies will also be addressed. These studies cover a period from 1986 to 1994 and include Air Force audits, Air Force Logistics Management Agency Studies, and major command tests. 
Management and Control of Aircraft Cannibalizations within Tactical
Audit Findings
Not surprisingly the audit found that, the less time allowed before HQ reporting was required, the higher the number of CANNs because the supply system had not been given the ability to supply the part. Of the 162 CANNs for HQ avoidance reviewed in TAC, 84
were provided by the supply system within the 21-day criteria. If a 30-day standard had been utilized, 101 of the parts would have been issued by supply, a 17 percent decrease in the need for CANNs. For 32 CANNs performed overseas for HQ avoidance, 16 parts were received within the 30-day standard. Under a 40-day standard, supply would have provided 26 of these parts, a 63 percent CANN reduction. 3 System deterioration was provided as the rationale to support command HQ thresholds, but there was no analytical data to support the specified standards or explain the differences in the command standards for similar aircraft.
Key Recommendation and Management Comments
The key recommendation for the HQ program was for the Air Staff to perform analysis to determine the amount of time an aircraft can be down without causing damage and use this as the basis for the command HQ standards. In response to this, the Air Staff concurred with the intent, but not with the recommendation. 
Management of Aircraft Cannibalization Air Force Audit Agency Project 91062014, 1 October 1992
This audit is very similar to the one performed in 1986. It focused on two key aspects of cannibalization. First, whether the CANNs were appropriate. Second, how well CANN data was captured in the maintenance data collection system. This study Though the first aspect is the main concern for this paper, the second indicates that CANN data may be understated by approximately ten percent in the maintenance data collection system and visibility of serially controlled assets may be impacted. 
Key Recommendation and Management Comments
As a result of this audit, "the AF/LG should require the operating commands to reassesses and, as appropriate, revise the HQ threshold considering (a) expected supply response times and (b) the periods of inoperability that can occur without damage to the aircraft systems. citing the same type of emotional issues: "every base had at least one and sometimes several aircraft which had been so long and so extensively cannibalized that recovery was virtually impossible", "Bitter experience taught us that the longer an aircraft was unutilized, the more difficult it was to recover as a sortie producing asset, not only because seals had deteriorated and other mechanical degradation had taken place…." were conducted at the field and depot levels to address traditional maintenance issues concerning the HQ program. The report did not find evidence that a HQ threshold was either beneficial or harmful to an F-16 aircraft. It was also unable to find any quantitative evidence of excessive maintenance resulting from the HQ threshold policy, but interviews indicated that almost everyone believed this to be true. 16 In response to the HQ program preventing units turning their aircraft into shells, the study showed that this does not happen at units without a HQ program. Based on these facts, the report recommended the commands consider eliminating the HQ program. Of course, this recommendation brought on another emotional based response from the MAJCOMs. The study failed to produce hard data to determine the "right" number of days for an aircraft to be on the ground. The study needed to focus on the costs/benefits of swapping out CANN jets less frequently. I was only able to locate two responses to this study.
The first response to the AFLMA report was from the ATC/LG. He stated that the researchers missed the point of the HQ program and strongly disagreed with the recommendations. The real intent of the HQ program was to force units to work the hard-broke aircraft and get them flying instead of only using the "good flyers."
Comments from depot personnel concerning about the benefits of leaving a CANN jet down longer were a "smoke screen" because it is easier for them to manage parts based on a supply rate instead of preventing HQ aircraft.
17
ACC/LG concurred with the ATC/LG and stated that the report measured the cost of the HQ program, but was unable to measure the benefit. He used a metaphor to help point out the unseen benefits: "Just because children no longer contract once fatal diseases is no reason to eliminate an immunization program." 18 The fact that there are no "dust covered" aircraft in a hangar that has not flown for a year causes people to see the HQ program as a nuisance.
19
PACAF Test of a 50-Day Hangar Queen Threshold
Following the AFLMA study, HQ USAF/LGM sent a memorandum to the commands to summarize the recent efforts concerning the HQ program. He felt that, "Although the issues raised in this AFAA audit and AFLMA report generate diverse views, we believe that such dialogue is constructive and results from th fact that this audit concerns issues important to our convictions on how best to maintain readiness and defend budgets." -LG/DOGM Survey Respondent Of the 7 responses that supported the ACC 30-day standard, it was clear that 2 people felt the 30-day threshold was only a local management issue. While they would try to return the aircraft to flight within 30 days, the graduated ACC program still provided the flexibility to keep the aircraft down longer if the situation required. The more traditional "hardcore maintenance" approach was taken by 4 of the respondents.
These maintainers were against any extension of the threshold and one even preferred to swap out "cann jets" every two weeks. The rational for less time on the ground was based on a belief that the benefits of increased downtime did not outweigh the costs.
Specifically, the increased difficulty in rebuilding a CANN jet and the problems of getting the aircraft back to flying good were cited as the reason to minimize downtime.
The last of the 7 responses did not supply enough information to determine the basis for preference of the ACC threshold. -LG/DOGM Survey Respondent Of the 13 surveys that supported a longer threshold for HQ status, I was able to determine that at least 5 survey opinions were based on experience with both the 30 and 50-day standard. These individuals indicated that they see the benefits of keeping an aircraft as a CANN jet longer without negative impacts on returning the aircraft to flight.
Supporters of a Longer Threshold
Two of these maintainers have seen these benefits at their current ACC base after deciding locally to accept Category 1 HQs. One person pointed out the additional savings created by utilizing components that are awaiting installation in the CANN jet, instead of having to expended the man-hours for the removal. This almost provides a forward supply point for high usage items with intermittent availability in the supply system. Most of the individuals favoring the longer threshold believed that the extended downtime gave the supply system more time to provide the part as high priority, mission capable (MICAP), requisition. This decreased the occurrence of multiple CANNs of the same part from CANN jet to CANN jet Chapter 5
Conclusions
We cannibalize only as a last resort.
-Gen Michael Ryan House Armed Services Committee Testimony, 27 Sep 00
While it is hard to dispute that command HQ programs were originally needed to offset a lack of maintenance discipline in the field, we need to be able to take an honest look at the program's purpose in today's maintenance environment. If we can agree that is still a good idea to have command directed, structured management oversight of aircraft that have been down for extended periods of time, we still must examine the program guidelines to make sure they were based on validated requirements. Once we agree that the program is needed and establish criteria for fighter aircraft based on data, these requirements should be standardized throughout the combat air forces. The controversy over the basis for establishing HQ thresholds is as valid today as it was when the programs were originally established. Except for the 6-month PACAF test, no head to head studies have been done to measure the effects of the 30/50-day HQ thresholds.
While neither of these standards may be the "right" number, there should be little doubt that the 50-day threshold is more beneficial. As with any issue, this can be disputed, but all of the studies indicate it is true. The longer threshold provides the field with more flexibility and removes the perceived negative aspect of leaving aircraft in "cann status" longer. Though some units under the ACC 30-day threshold have made a conscious decision to accept category 1 HQs, others will still expend maintenance resources to prevent even a category 1 HQ. CANNs to rebuild a CANN jet will never be completely prevented by a longer threshold; however, a shorter threshold can and does drive more CANNs. CANN jet swap out is based on numerous factors: phase time issues, hard breaks on other aircraft, or unavailability of parts that can not be cannibalized. Swap outs performed solely to beat the 30-day HQ clock are not based on a validated requirement and should not be driven directly or indirectly from the MAJCOM. My intent is not merely to avoid CANNs, just to ensure CANN man-hours are expended for the right reasons. CANNs should always be performed to ensure the maximum numbers of aircraft are available not only for the day's schedule, but to be ready to go to war. 
